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Human Capital and Popular Investment Advice
Abstract
Popular investment advice recommends that the stock/bond and stock/wealth ratios should
rise with investor risk tolerance and investment horizon respectively, prescriptions that are
difficult to reconcile with the simple mean-variance model. We show that extending the
mean-variance model to include human capital, without any other modifications, can simul-
taneously justify both recommendations, so long as the correlation between labour income
and stock returns falls within a range determined by market and investor-specific parame-
ters. Aggregate labour income data from 11 countries generally satisfy this requirement, as
do plausible individual income processes. We also consider the implications of human capital
for the optimal bond/wealth ratio over the investment horizon, and examine the sensitivity
of the stock/bond mix to the volatility of labour income.
JEL classification: G11
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I Introduction
One of the cornerstones of modern portfolio theory is the two-fund separation theorem. This
seminal result, originally due to Tobin (1958), states that the composition of the optimal portfolio
of risky assets depends solely on the stochastic structure of market returns and is independent of
investor-specific characteristics such as risk tolerance. However, Canner et al. (1997) document
investment advice recommending that less risk-tolerant investors hold a higher ratio of bonds
to stocks, a phenomenon they refer to as the asset allocation puzzle. As they point out, this is
perplexing not only because the advice differs from that implied by theory, but also because it
is more complicated than theory.1
For many investors, human capital is a significant part of their overall portfolio, but it
plays no role in the one-period mean-variance model that gives rise to the two-fund separation
theorem.2 Extending the model to incorporate human capital can potentially resolve the asset
allocation puzzle. To see this, suppose that returns to human capital are perfectly correlated
with those on stocks. Then human capital and stocks are perfect substitutes, so the separation
theorem implies that the ratio
BONDS
HUMAN CAPITAL + STOCKS
is independent of investor risk tolerance. An increase in risk tolerance increases both the nu-
merator and denominator of this ratio in the same proportion. But at any point in time, the
quantity of human capital is non-tradable and thus fixed, so the quantity of stocks must rise
proportionately more than the quantity of bonds. That is, the ratio of stocks to bonds is greater
for more risk-tolerant investors, just as popular advice recommends.
However, Canner et al. (1997) reject this explanation on two grounds. First, human capital
and stocks are unlikely to be perfect substitutes for many investors. Second, if human capital
returns are strongly correlated with stock returns, then it becomes difficult to reconcile theory
with another popular piece of investment advice: that young investors with long investment
horizons should hold more of their wealth in stocks than older investors.3 In general, young
investors have more human capital than their older counterparts, so a high positive correlation
1This advice also seems to be followed in practice. Degeorge et al. (2004) examine the participation decisions
of France Telecom employees in that firm’s 1997 privatization share offering and find that civil servant workers
invest proportionately more in the most “bond-like” vehicle than do their (plausibly less risk averse) private sector
counterparts. Other proxies for risk aversion yield similar patterns.
2Nevertheless, the potential importance of human capital for financial decisions has long been recognized. For
example, Mayers (1972) shows that the presence of non-marketable assets such as human capital introduce an
extra term into the CAPM risk premium. More recently, Bodie et al. (1992), Heaton and Lucas (1997), and
Viceira (2001), among others, examine the role of labour and business income for various portfolio decisions.
3A simple rule of thumb recommends that the portfolio percentage devoted to stocks should equal 100 minus
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between stocks and human capital implies that young investors optimally allocate less of their
wealth to stocks, thereby contradicting the standard advice. By contrast, if stocks are a good
hedge for human capital, then younger investors should indeed hold a higher proportion of their
wealth in stocks, just as popular advice dictates. But then the advice that more risk-tolerant
investors hold a higher ratio of stocks to bonds cannot be explained.
Thus, human capital considerations seem unable to resolve the asset allocation puzzle with-
out simultaneously creating another equally perplexing puzzle. On the one hand, the strong
correlation between human capital returns and stock returns required to justify the asset allo-
cation advice makes the investment horizon advice more puzzling. On the other hand, the weak
correlation between human capital returns and stock returns required to justify the investment
horizon advice exacerbates the asset allocation puzzle. More succinctly, it seems impossible for
the human capital of any investor to simultaneously justify both pieces of advice.4
One explanation for this conundrum is that investment advisors are simply wrong.5 How-
ever, such a pessimistic conclusion warrants further scrutiny. Specifically, we ask two questions.
First, despite the misgivings outlined above, is it theoretically possible for human capital con-
siderations to reconcile the simple mean-variance model with popular advice on asset allocation
and investment horizon? Second, if such a theoretical explanation does exist, is it empirically
plausible? That is, given the ubiquitous nature of these investment recommendations, do the
conditions required for human capital to offer an explanation in theory seem likely to also exist
in practice?
For the first question, we use a simple extension of the Campbell and Viceira (2002) log-linear
version of the mean-variance model, and show that human capital factors can justify popular
advice about both asset allocation and investment horizon decisions so long as the correlation
between stock and human capital returns falls within some range defined by market and investor-
specific parameters. To address the second question, we use historical data on aggregate asset
returns and labour income from 11 countries to estimate these parameters and find that, at least
for the various data sets we employ, the stock-human capital correlation generally falls within
the allowed range. We offer some tentative evidence suggesting that this is also likely to be true
the investor’s age; see also the Vanguard Group advice quoted in Ameriks and Zeldes (2001). This process is
sometimes known as ‘time diversification’; see Kritzman (1994) and Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) for
particularly lucid discussions.
4Of course, one could argue that the investment horizon advice is justified by other considerations. For
example, long-term stock returns could be mean-reverting, so that stocks are less risky over a long investment
horizon. However, in 75 years of data from 30 countries, Jorion (2003) finds little evidence of this. Moreover,
Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) argue that human capital considerations represent the only convincing
explanation for the view that the stock/wealth ratio should rise with investment horizon.
5See Anonymous (1997) for an example of this interpretation.
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for most individual labour income processes.
Previous research has identified other possible solutions for the asset allocation puzzle. Elton
and Gruber (2000) argue that theory and popular advice can be reconciled by introducing various
constraints into the mean-variance model, while Shalit and Yitzhaki (2003) suggest that the
advice is not necessarily inefficient for alternative investor preferences. In addition, Brennan
and Xia (2000) and Campbell and Viceira (2001) show that time-varying expected returns
can justify the advice for an infinitely-lived investor. None of these, however, considers the
relevance of their analysis for investment horizon considerations. Other authors, such as Bodie
et al. (1992), Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996), and Viceira (2001), show that human
capital considerations can justify the popular investment horizon advice, but do not discuss the
asset allocation puzzle. None of this work, therefore, considers whether or not recognition of
non-tradable human capital can simultaneously justify both pieces of investment advice.
An interesting exception to this is Gomes and Michaelides (2002), who calibrate a multi-
period model with non-mean-variance preferences and a fixed market entry cost and find optimal
behaviour that is broadly consistent with both pieces of investment advice. Our work differs
from theirs in two ways. First, their primary focus is on other matters, so they do not explore
the source of this consistency in any detail. Second, and more importantly, their model is
much more complex than ours. The primary contribution of our work is to show that inclusion
of human capital in the simple mean-variance model, without any further modifications, can
potentially resolve the investment advice puzzles associated with that model. Although the
dynamic effects associated with multi-period decision-making, for example, are undoubtedly
important for explaining other types of investment behaviour and practice, our analysis indicates
that they are not essential for explaining the puzzle documented in this paper.
In the next two sections, we outline our model and apply it to the investment advice puzzle.
Section IV contains the results of our calibration exercise. In Section V, we go beyond existing
investment advice and apply our model to some additional questions. If it is indeed optimal
to reduce stock holdings as the investment horizon shortens, what happens to optimal bond
holdings? And does the optimal ratio of stocks to bonds depend on the volatility of labour
income? Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II Optimal asset allocation in the presence of non-tradable hu-
man capital
An investor has some initial endowment of financial wealth W > 0 which is used to construct a
portfolio that generates the random rate of return Rp. One period later, the investor consumes
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the portfolio’s liquidation value W (1 +Rp) and labour income L earned over the period.
At the beginning of the period, the investor chooses the portfolio that maximizes the expected
utility of terminal wealth W =W (1+Rp)+L. This decision is determined by the power utility
function
U(W ) =
W 1−γ
1− γ
, (1)
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In Campbell and Viceira (2002), the investor’s portfolio decision consists of choosing the
optimal combination of two assets, one of which is riskless while the other is risky. To address
the asset allocation puzzle of Canner et al. (1997), we require two risky assets, so we extend the
Campbell and Viceira model to a three-asset setting. Asset f , which we call cash, is riskless
and offers the rate of return Rf over the period. Asset s, which we call stocks, is risky with a
random rate of return Rs. Asset b, which we call bonds, is also risky and has a random rate of
return Rb. We assume that 1+Rs, 1+Rb, and labour income L are lognormal random variables.
The portfolio shares allocated to assets s and b are αs and αb respectively. Thus, the
investor chooses these portfolio shares to maximize the expected value of (1) subject to the
budget constraint
W =W (1 +Rp) + L, (2)
where Rp = Rf + αs(Rs − Rf ) + αb(Rb − Rf ). This problem is nonlinear, so we apply some
linear approximations that effectively reduce it to a mean-variance setting. The details of this
procedure are straightforward, but tedious, so we relegate them to an appendix. There we show
that the optimal asset allocations are
αs =
1
∆
(
1
ργ
(
σ2bµs − σsbµb
)
+
(
1−
1
ρ
)(
σ2bσls − σsbσlb
))
, (3)
αb =
1
∆
(
1
ργ
(
σ2sµb − σsbµs
)
+
(
1−
1
ρ
)(
σ2sσlb − σsbσls
))
, (4)
where, for i = s, b, l = logL, ri = log(1 + Ri), σ
2
i = Var[ri], σsb = Cov[rs, rb], σli = Cov[l, ri],
∆ = σ2sσ
2
b − σ
2
sb is the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix, µi = E[ri] − rf + σ
2
i /2
is the logarithmic risk premium for asset i, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a linearization parameter that is
defined in detail in the appendix.
Note that without labour income, the second terms in the large brackets in (3) and (4) both
equal zero, so the ratio αs/αb is independent of investor risk attitudes γ, i.e., the two-fund
separation theorem applies. With labour income, however, this independence disappears. In the
next section, we determine whether this can change the model’s implications in a way that is
consistent with popular investment advice.
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In doing so, the term
φp ≡ αb
∂E[rp]
∂αb
+ αs
∂E[rp]
∂αs
often appears, where E[rp] = E[log(1 +Rp)] is the expected log return on the chosen portfolio.
φp thus represents the effect on the expected log portfolio return of shifting investment funds
from the riskless asset to the risky asset portfolio. Such a shift obviously increases the expected
simple portfolio return E[Rp] so long as the individual asset risk-premia are positive, but the log
counterpart E[rp] is a quadratic function of the portfolio weights, so the sign of φp is ambiguous.
In the appendix, we show that
φp = Var[rp](γ(ρ+ (1− ρ)β)− 1), (5)
where β = Cov[rp, l]/Var[rp]. Intuitively, when labour income risk is idiosyncratic (β = 0),
investors with γρ = 1 hold the portfolio with the maximum expected log portfolio return, so less
conservative investors (γρ < 1) who allocate more of their portfolio to risky assets must have
a lower E[rp], i.e., φp is negative for such investors. When labour income risk is systematic,
investors with γρ = 1 allocate more or less to risky assets, depending on whether risky assets
are a good or poor hedge against labour income shocks. In general, φp is positive so long as
investor risk aversion is not too low and labour income is not too negatively correlated with
risky asset returns.
In what follows, we focus on the case where φp is positive, for the following reasons. First,
most existing evidence suggests that most investors have high γ and a labour income stream
that has positive, or at least not strongly negative, correlation with risky asset returns. Second,
φp is always positive in the data we use below. Third, any reversal of our results would require
φp to be strongly, and implausibly, negative, so focusing on cases where it is positive sacrifices
little generality while considerably simplifying the accompanying discussion.
III Risk aversion, investment horizon, and optimal asset choice
We first determine the effect of risk aversion γ on the ratio α ≡ αs/αb. According to the
two-fund separation theorem, α and γ are independent, but popular advice, as documented in
Canner et al. (1997), recommends that less risk-tolerant investors hold a lower ratio of stocks to
bonds. That is, ∂α/∂γ should be negative.
In our model, dα/dγ has the same sign as (see the appendix)
(1 + φp)(µsσlb − µbσls). (6)
Let cli = σli/σlσi denote the linear correlation coefficient for human capital and asset i returns.
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Then so long as φp > −1, (6) is negative if and only if
cls > H, (7)
where H = clb(µs/σs)/(µb/σb).
6 Thus, more risk-tolerant investors should indeed hold a higher
proportion of stocks, so long as their labour income is sufficiently strongly correlated with stock
returns, the required extent of which is determined by the relative size of the stock and bond
Sharpe ratios. This condition reflects the balancing of the two determinants of asset demand:
the ability to hedge human capital returns and the risk-return trade-off as measured by the
Sharpe ratio. If (7) is satisfied, the hedging capabilities of the bond are sufficient to offset the
risk-return properties of the stock, so investors who wish to reduce their risk exposure hold less
of both stocks and bonds, but reduce stock holdings by more since they must continue to hold
their non-tradable human capital.7
This result is a simple extension of the Canner et al. (1997) argument that human capital
considerations can justify popular asset allocation advice if stocks and human capital are perfect
substitutes. It shows that human capital need only be relatively more “stock-like” than “bond-
like”, thereby negating Canner et al.’s concern that perfect substitutability is unlikely to be the
case for most investors. What remains unresolved is whether this weaker condition can also
overcome Canner et al.’s other, more important, objection: that relatively “stock-like” human
capital is inconsistent with popular advice on the relationship between investment horizon and
optimal stock holdings. This advice is neatly summarized by Malkiel (1996):
“. . . the longer the time period over which you can hold on to your investments, the
greater should be the share of common stocks in your portfolio.”
However, if human capital is strongly correlated with the stock market, then the holding of
“stock-like” assets automatically increases with the investment horizon, thereby implying that
the share of traded stocks should be smaller the longer the time period over which the portfolio
can be held. If human capital considerations are to be a plausible explanation for the asset allo-
cation puzzle, then the required condition (7) should not rule out the recommended relationship
between stock holdings and investment horizon, i.e., the required high correlation between stock
market returns and labour income should not be so high as to imply that investors with a long
time horizon should hold a lower share of common stocks in their portfolios.
6To avoid unnecessary complications associated with negative numbers, we anticipate our subsequent empirical
findings and assume µb > 0.
7If φp < −1, then the risky asset portfolio is a particularly good hedge against labour income risk (see (5)), so
investors who wish to reduce their risk exposure hold more risky assets, and, in particular, hold relatively more
of the risky asset most like human capital since their direct holdings of the latter are fixed.
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To address this issue, we use the parameter z ≡ E[log(L/W )] as a proxy for the length of
investment horizon. This can be justified by noting that young investors, with long investment
horizons and long working lives, have high expected future labour income but low financial
wealth, so they have higher z than do older investors with shorter investment horizons.8
In our model, dαs/dz has the same sign as (see the appendix)
σ2b (µs − γσls)− σsb(µb − γσlb). (8)
To justify popular advice, this expression must be positive. This occurs if and only if
cls < H, (9)
where H = (1/γσlσs)(µs − (csbσs/σb)µb) + csbclb. Thus, long-horizon investors should indeed
allocate a greater proportion of their wealth to stocks so long as the correlation between stock
returns and labour income is not too high.9 The condition appearing in (9) gives concrete
expression to what is meant by “not too high”. If (9) is satisfied, then stocks are a good hedge
for non-tradable human capital, so a young investor with a long investment horizon puts more
into stocks than an older investor with a shorter horizon, just as popular advice recommends.
Of course, what we are primarily interested in is whether the joint distribution of labour
income and stock and bond returns can justify popular advice in relation to both asset allocation
and investment horizon; that is, whether (7) and (9) can hold simultaneously. This occurs if
and only if
H < cls < H. (10)
Thus, so long as the correlation between stock returns and labour income lies between two
bounds, investors should allocate less of their wealth to stocks as their investment horizon
shortens and they should adjust their bond/stock ratios downwards in response to any increase
in tolerance for risk.
Various parameter combinations would automatically disqualify this requirement. For ex-
ample, if the stochastic structure of asset returns and labour income were such that H ≥ H,
or H ≤ −1, or H ≥ 1, then (10) cannot hold. However, inspection of H and H reveals that
there are combinations of parameters for which (10) is satisfied, so it is theoretically possible for
human capital considerations to reconcile the simple mean-variance model with popular advice
on asset allocation in a way that does not conflict with other popular advice on the relationship
between stock holdings and the investment horizon. What remains unclear is whether such a
possibility is empirically plausible; that is, whether actual parameter values satisfy (10).
8Young investors also have greater future liabilities (consumption) than their older counterparts, but this
important difference cannot be captured in a static model.
9See Bodie et al. (1992) and Jagannathan and Kocherlatoka (1996) for a similar conclusion.
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Table 1: U.S. estimates of cls, H, and H
Popular investment advice on (i) stock/bond allocation and risk tolerance and (ii) stock/wealth
allocation and investment horizon can both be justified if and only if H < cls < H, where cls
is the linear correlation between labour income and stock returns, and H and H are constants
that depend on market and investor-specific parameters. For the U.S., for each year in the period
1930–1999, market return data are obtained from Ibbotson Associates and labour income data from
the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Based on a Wald test, ∗ indicates that cls−H (or H−cls) is positive at the 10% significance
level, ∗∗ that it is positive at the 5% level, and ∗∗∗ that it is positive at the 1% level.
Bond type Sample cls H H γ for which
Begin End γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = 10 cls < H
Long-term corporate bonds 1930 1999 0.11 −0.02 4.34∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0 < γ < 75.4
Long-term government bonds 1930 1999 0.11 −0.12 4.66∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0 < γ < 75.1
Intermediate government bonds 1930 1999 0.11 0.03 5.05∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0 < γ < 91.5
IV Empirical estimates of cls, H, and H
To determine whether our model’s justification of popular advice is plausible, we use historical
data to estimate cls, H, and H. If these estimates satisfy (10), then this is consistent with
the view that popular investment advice implicitly incorporates human capital considerations;
failure to satisfy (10) suggests that popular investment advice cannot be justified by human
capital considerations, at least not in the way envisaged by our model.
To obtain estimates of the terms in (10), we employ time series of asset returns and aggregate
labour income data. Initially, we use per-capita income data from the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the period 1930–99, together with annual
U.S. market returns data from Ibbotson Associates.10 Ibbotsons report real returns for long-term
government bonds, intermediate-term government bonds, and corporate bonds, so we calculate
H and H for each bond type; real stock returns are calculated from the large company index.
With these data, we calculate estimates of the various means, standard deviations, and
correlations that appear in equations (3) and (4). We then substitute these estimates into
the terms appearing in (10), a process that yields the results in Table 1. Focusing first on
the difference between H and cls, the labour-stock correlation is 0.11, but the estimates of H
range from −0.12 to 0.03. Thus, regardless of the class of bond, the first inequality in (10) is
10The BEA data are available from http://www.bea.doc.gov/. Ideally, we would use actual human capital data,
but we are unable to locate reliable sources of this variable for most of the countries we subsequently examine.
Since labour income is equal to human capital in a one-period world, we use the former as a proxy for the latter.
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satisfied. Turning to the second inequality, we report estimates of H for low, medium, and high
values of γ (γ = 2, 5, 10 respectively).11 Most of these estimates are greater than unity, thereby
automatically exceeding cls; even the smallest estimate of H is almost eight times as large as
the labour-stock correlation. In the final column of Table 1, we express this result in a different
way by reporting the range of γ values for which H − cls is positive; for this not to occur, γ
must attain at least the implausibly-high value of 75.12
While these results are consistent with our model, some important caveats apply. To begin
with, the terms in (10) depend in part on means and correlations, parameters that are notoriously
difficult to estimate with any precision. Thus, the point estimates appearing in Table 1 are likely
to be subject to considerable error.
To address this issue, we use a Wald test of both inequalities in (10).13 For the first inequality,
we define
h1 = µbσls − µsσlb
and test the null hypothesis that h1 ≤ 0 against the alternative that h1 > 0. For the second
inequality, we define
h2 = σ
2
bµs − σsbµb − γ(σ
2
bσls − σsbσlb)
and test the null hypothesis that h2 ≤ 0 against the alternative that h2 > 0. In either case,
rejecting the null supports the corresponding inequality in (10).
The results of this test procedure also appear in Table 1 and provide both good and bad
news for our story. The good news is that h2 is positive at the 1% significance level in all cases,
even at the highest level of risk aversion. The bad news is that h1 is insignificantly different
from zero in all cases. This difference reflects the fact that the estimated standard errors for H
and cls are quite small, whereas that for H is large.
14 Thus, our U.S. data strongly support the
notion that human capital considerations can explain the investment horizon advice, but are
rather more reticent about the asset allocation advice.
Another possible reservation about our results is that they apply to a single country only,
yet the investment advice seems to be an international phenomenon. To examine this issue, we
11Because σ2bµs − σsbµb > 0 in our data, H is monotonically decreasing in γ.
12We also calculate cls, H, and H assuming that asset returns are lagged one year, reflecting possible lags in
labour income (see Campbell et al., 2001). Although this results in different estimates of cls and H individually,
it has virtually no effect on the difference between them. Similarly, the difference between H and cls remains
large and positive.
13See, for example, Greene (1993, pp. 131–133).
14Indeed, in order for the point estimates in Table 1 to be able to reject the null that h1 ≤ 0 at the 5%
significance level, we would need approximately 350 years of data in the case of long-term government bonds, and
even more for the other two bond categories.
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estimate the terms in (10) with data from other countries. For asset returns, we use the data
series generated by Dimson et al. (2002); these contain annual real returns on equities, bonds
and bills from 1901 to 2002 for 15 countries (not including the U.S.).15 For labour income, we
use International Financial Statistics data published by the IMF, deflating these nominal series
by their corresponding CPI values. The income series are of shorter duration than the Dimson
et al. returns series and, moreover, are not available for all 15 countries. In all, we are able to
calibrate our model with data from 10 additional countries over post-WWII periods of varying
length. For completeness, we also include the U.S. to check that our earlier results are not
sensitive to the source of labour income data.
The results from using these data appear in Table 2. Several features are apparent. First,
the post-WWII results for the U.S. are very similar to those for the longer time period reported
in Table 1. Second, for eight of the other 10 countries, the bounds specified by (10) are satisfied,
consistent with popular investment advice being motivated by human capital considerations.
Moreover, in most of these eight countries, cls differs from its two bounds by fairly large margins.
In the two countries (Canada and Italy) where the first bound is violated, the difference is small.
Third, cls is less than H at conventional significance levels in all countries for all reported values
of γ. Moreover, cls ≥ H only for implausibly-high risk aversion. Fourth, cls is greater than H
at conventional significance levels in three countries (France, Japan, and the U.K.).
Overall, our international data paint much the same picture as U.S. data: they provide
strong support for the link envisaged by our model between human capital and investment
horizon advice, but statistically weaker support for the human capital link with asset allocation
advice.
A third area of concern is that our labour income parameter values are based on aggregate
per-capita income data and thus may differ greatly from the parameter values of actual individ-
ual investors. In particular, macroeconomic stabilization policies and the levelling inherent in
aggregation suggest that individual labour income processes are likely to be much less smooth
than the aggregate per-capita process. Moreover, individual labour income characteristics ex-
hibit considerable cross-sectional dispersion and the ubiquitous and unconditional nature of the
investment advice suggests that it should apply to all investors, not just those whose labour in-
come process is similar to that implied by aggregate data. These issues imply a need to consider
the possible effect on our results of labour income that is both more volatile and more correlated
with stock returns.
Focusing first on correlations, note that higher cls alone makes it more likely that the critical
value H is exceeded. Thus, greater individual correlations make it easier to justify the asset
15These data are available from Ibbotson Associates.
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Table 2: International estimates of cls, H, and H
This table repeats the calculations of Table 1, but for alternative data sets. Market returns are
calculated from the real bond, equity, and bill indices in Dimson et al. (2002). Labour income for
each country is generated using IMF labour income data, deflated by the respective CPI series.
As in Table 1, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the corresponding bound on cls in (10) is statistically
significant (using a Wald test) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
Country Sample cls H H γ for which
Begin End γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = 10 cls < H
Australia 1963 2002 −0.29 −0.68 7.82∗∗ 3.11∗∗ 1.53∗∗ γ > 0
Canada 1949 2002 −0.00 0.09 10.15∗∗ 4.06∗∗ 2.03∗∗ γ > 0
France 1950 2002 0.14 −0.07∗ 4.85∗ 1.92∗ 0.94∗ 0 < γ < 57.3
Ireland 1949 2002 0.38 0.08 7.81∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 0 < γ < 42.0
Italy 1960 2002 −0.25 −0.21 3.16∗ 1.24∗ 0.60∗ γ > 0
Japan 1949 2002 0.34 −0.18∗ 4.46∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0 < γ < 26.0
Netherlands 1950 2002 −0.02 −0.12 9.38∗∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ γ > 0
Spain 1961 2002 −0.13 −0.52 3.77∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0 < γ < 826.8
Sweden 1961 2002 −0.03 −0.08 6.21∗∗ 2.48∗∗ 1.24∗∗ γ > 0
UK 1957 2002 −0.16 −1.03∗∗ 8.58∗∗ 3.29∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 0 < γ < 241.0
US 1949 2002 0.14 −0.03 14.60∗∗∗ 5.84∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 0 < γ < 207.4
allocation advice. By contrast, higher cls makes it less likely that the correlation falls short of
H, the critical value needed to justify the investment horizon advice. However, inspection of
Tables 1 and 2 shows that the individual correlations would have to be implausibly high for this
condition not to be satisfied: even when γ = 10, the minimum correlation required is 0.6; for
lower γ values, this rises above the maximum-possible value of 1.0.
A further complication, although probably a second-order one, is that individual bond-
labour correlations may also differ from the aggregate per-capita value. For some individuals,
this correlation could be negative if their employment prospects are interest-rate sensitive. In
any event, high clb makes it less likely that the asset allocation advice can be justified, but more
likely that the investment horizon advice is optimal; low clb has the opposite effect.
Turning to the volatility effect, H is independent of σl, so higher income volatility on the part
of individuals has no impact on the justification for the asset allocation advice. It does, however,
change H, albeit in an ambiguous manner that depends on the sign of µs − (csbσs/σb)µb. In
our data, this term is positive, so higher income volatility makes it more difficult to justify the
investment horizon advice.
To quantitatively assess the sensitivity of our results to individual income streams that are
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Figure 1: Combinations of clb and cls that justify both pieces of investment advice
The two shaded areas together represent all combinations of clb and cls for which both the asset
allocation advice and the investment horizon advice are justified (i.e., satisfy (10)) when σl is set
equal to our estimate from aggregate 1930–1999 U.S. data. When σl is changed to three times
its aggregate per-capita value, the allowed (clb, cls) combinations are now those falling in the dark
shaded region only.
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-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
clb
cls
both systematically and unsystematically riskier than aggregate per capita income, we proceed
in two steps. First, for σl equal to its aggregate per-capita value, we calculate the combinations
of clb and cls which satisfy (10). Second, we increase σl by a factor of three and re-calculate the
set of required (clb, cls) combinations.
16 We repeat this process for each country in our data set.
Throughout, we set γ = 5.
The results for the 1930–1999 U.S. data (using long-term government bonds as the bond
class; the other classes yield essentially the same results) are illustrated in Figure 1. The two
shaded areas together represent all combinations of cls and clb for which both the asset allocation
advice and the investment horizon advice are justified (i.e., satisfy (10)) when σl is set equal to
our estimate from aggregate data. In this case, only the asset allocation constraint (7) turns out
to be binding for these data; the investment horizon constraint (9) is satisfied for all possible
values of clb and cls. As a result, even very high values of cls are feasible so long as clb is not
16The tripling of σl, although necessarily somewhat arbitrary, is based on Campbell et al. (2001). They estimate
labour income variances for three different U.S. educational-achievement groups and report a maximum estimate
approximately nine times our per-capita estimate for the U.S., so we increase our per-capita estimates for each
country by the same factor.
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also too positive. Overall, both pieces of investment advice are justified for any value of cls so
long as clb < −0.4; every subsequent 10-point increase in clb rules out successively higher values
of cls and raises the minimum cls by approximately 25 points. Once clb reaches about 0.4, the
minimum cls exceeds 1 and the asset allocation advice cannot be justified.
Matters change somewhat when σl is changed to three times its aggregate per-capita value.
Because this risk is non-tradable, other risky assets become less attractive and stocks must
therefore be a better human-capital hedge (i.e., lower cls) in order to justify the investment
horizon advice. In this case, the investment horizon constraint (9) also binds and the allowed
(clb, cls) combinations are now those falling in the dark shaded region only. The principal effect
of this is to eliminate some of the high cls values. Where previously, for example, cls as high
as unity could justify both pieces of advice, now the maximum-possible value of cls ranges from
0.65 (when clb equals approximately 0.25) down to 0.35 (when clb equals −1).
One useful way of summarizing the information in plots like Figure 1 is given by the vertical
dashed line. This depicts all values of cls that justify both pieces of investment advice when clb
is equal to its aggregate per-capita value. For the 1930–1999 U.S. data, the “allowable” values
for cls range from −0.12 to 1.00; this becomes −0.12 to 0.61 when σl is increased to three times
its aggregate per-capita estimate. Both ranges seem likely to encompass the income processes
for most individuals.17
For all other countries in our data set, we plot the corresponding vertical lines and report
the resulting cls ranges in Table 3. For most countries, the allowable range of cls values is very
wide indeed, and is reduced only slightly by significantly higher labour income volatility; only
in Italy and Spain does the maximum-possible correlation fall below 0.5.
Finally, our model assumes that labour income is given by a simple exogenous process,
thereby ruling out any flexibility in labour supply. However, as Bodie et al. (1992) point out,
altering the supply of labour in response to economic conditions effectively allows investors
to mitigate some of the risk associated with holding non-tradable human capital. This begs
the question of how labour supply flexibility might alter our conclusions. Fortunately, this is
straightforward to incorporate in our model, so we omit the details and focus on the intuition.18
The ability to adjust labour supply means that holdings of the human capital asset are no
longer “fixed”, so there is less need to hedge the risk of this asset. This strengthens the case for
the investment horizon advice: because labour supply can be varied, human capital is effectively
less risky and thus younger investors do not need stocks to be such a good hedge in order to
17The maximum labour-stock correlation reported by Campbell et al. (2001) is 0.52.
18Section 6.1.2 of Campbell and Viceira (2002) outlines a simple method for incorporating flexible labour supply
in portfolio models, and our discussion is based on that procedure.
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Table 3: Range of cls values that justify both pieces of investment advice
This table reports the range of cls values that justify both pieces of investment advice when clb is
equal to its aggregate per-capita value and γ = 5. Data are the same as in Table 2.
σl = aggregate σl = 3×aggregate
per-capita estimate per-capita estimate
Australia −0.68 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.68 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
Canada 0.09 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 0.09 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
France −0.07 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.07 ≤ cls ≤ 0.62
Ireland 0.08 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 0.08 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
Italy −0.21 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.21 ≤ cls ≤ 0.38
Japan −0.18 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.18 ≤ cls ≤ 0.59
Netherlands −0.12 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.12 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
Spain −0.52 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.52 ≤ cls ≤ 0.39
Sweden −0.08 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.08 ≤ cls ≤ 0.82
UK −0.94 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.94 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
US −0.03 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00 −0.03 ≤ cls ≤ 1.00
justify holding more of them. Expressed in terms of our model parameters, H rises. By contrast,
the asset allocation advice is unaffected: the relative demand for risky assets depends on the
relative strengths of these assets in hedging labour income, a feature that is unaltered by labour
supply flexibility.19
V Further issues
Our model can also be used to address other issues related to the two pieces of investment advice.
For example, the investment horizon advice explicitly states that the allocation to stocks should
decrease as the investment horizon shortens, but is less forthcoming on how this should affect
the allocation among other assets. Is “stocks” implicit shorthand for all risky assets, so that the
advice implies a reduction in both stocks and bonds, and therefore an increase in riskless cash,
over a shorter time horizon? Or does “stocks” really mean stocks, leaving open the possibility
that older investors should actually hold more bonds, even as they hold fewer stocks?
To address this issue, we calculate ∂αb/∂z. From (4), this has the sign of J − clb, where
J = (1/γσlσb)(µb − (csbσb/σs)µs) + csbcls.
If clb < J , then bonds are a good hedge for non-tradable risky labour income and so fewer are
19Of course, the crucial correlations are now with real wage shocks rather than labour income; the important
point is that condition (7) is otherwise unchanged.
15
Table 4: International estimates of clb and J
Young investors hold relatively more of their wealth in bonds than old investors if and only if clb < J ,
where J is a constant that depends on market and investor-specific parameters. Data are the same
as in Table 2.
J
clb γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = 10
Australia −0.18 0.22 0.05 −0.01
Canada 0.03 2.66 1.06 0.53
France −0.10 10.36 4.17 2.11
Ireland 0.03 −1.14 −0.35 −0.08
Italy −0.30 5.33 2.11 1.04
Japan −0.11 2.62 1.05 0.53
Netherlands −0.03 0.94 0.37 0.18
Spain −0.23 −0.81 −0.37 −0.22
Sweden −0.04 2.03 0.81 0.40
UK −0.39 −0.56 −0.25 −0.15
USA −0.01 3.83 1.54 0.78
needed as the investment horizon shortens. But if clb > J , then bonds are a good substitute for
human capital and older investors optimally hold more of them.
Using our multi-country data, we calculate J for each country and compare this with the
corresponding estimate of clb. The results appear in Table 4. For γ = 5, J comfortably exceeds
clb for all countries except Spain, suggesting that the investment horizon advice usually applied
to stocks also applies to bonds. Human capital is closer to an investment in cash than it is to
an investment in stocks or bonds.
Returning to the optimal allocation of wealth between different risky assets, the asset allo-
cation advice states that a lowering of investor tolerance towards a given level of risk should
result in substitution from stocks to bonds, but is silent on the optimal response to a change in
risk for a given level of tolerance. Given the focus of this paper, we are particularly interested
in the effect of a change in the risk of labour income. In this context, Campbell and Viceria
(2002) show that higher labour income risk lowers the allocation to risky assets if investors are
sufficiently risk averse. Our model allows us to take this a step further and determine the effect
of higher labour income risk (σl) on the allocation among risky assets.
The first point to note is that if labour income is idiosyncratic, then
α =
σ2bµs − σsbµb
σ2sµb − σsbµs
,
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which is independent of σl. An increase in the risk of the non-traded component of the portfolio
induces the investor to reduce the allocation to risky assets, but because the risk is idiosyncratic,
the two risky assets are equivalent hedges and hence their relative allocation is unaffected. The
risk of an investor’s human capital affects the allocation between riskless and risky assets, but
not the composition of the risky asset portfolio itself. Thus, we have an alternative separation
result: among investors with identical risk tolerance but differing levels of idiosyncratic human
capital risk, the portfolio risk decision can be separated from the risky asset allocation decision.
If labour income is not idiosyncratic, so that a change in σl also changes the covariances be-
tween asset returns and labour income, then matters become more complicated. In the appendix,
we show that dα/dσl has the same sign as
θ(µsσlb − µbσls), (11)
where
θ = 1 + (1− ρ)φp − ρσ
2
l .
We recognise the right-hand term in (11) as being identical to (6), so this determines which
risky asset is the closest substitute for human capital (i.e., has the highest relative correlation
with labour income). Thus, if θ is positive, then an increase in non-tradable labour income
risk reduces demand for the tradable risky asset that is most like human capital. However, the
sign of θ is ambiguous, reflecting two effects that shift demand in opposite directions. First,
faced with an increase in labour income risk, there is a standard substitution effect: risk-averse
investors rebalance their portfolios away from the human capital substitute towards the human
capital hedge. Second, there is an implicit income effect: with expected labour income held
constant, the rise in σl lowers the mean of log labour income. This lowers the human capital
allocation in the portfolio, thereby leading to greater demand for the tradable risky asset that
is the closest substitute for human capital. Overall, because the magnitude of the first effect is
proportional to 1 + (1− ρ)φp while the second is proportional to ρσ
2
l , an increase in σl leads to
a lower allocation for the risky asset that is the closest substitute for human capital if and only
if ρσ2l < 1 + (1− ρ)φp.
20
In our data, this condition is comfortably satisfied for all countries, while Tables 1 and 2
indicate that µsσlb − µbσls is negative. Thus, greater labour income risk should result in a
reallocation of risk capital from stocks to bonds.
20If φp < −1/(1−ρ), then the substitution effect also increases demand for the tradable risky asset that is most
like human capital, for reasons similar to those discussed in footnote 7.
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VI Concluding remarks
Can human capital considerations resolve the asset allocation puzzle of Canner et al. (1997)?
Those authors are doubtful, primarily because the strong correlation between stock returns and
labour income gains that would be required also implies that investors with a long investment
horizon should allocate less of their financial wealth to stocks, exactly the opposite of popular
investment advice. However, once non-tradable human capital is explicitly modelled, the optimal
stock-bond ratio depends not only on the correlations of these assets with labour income, but
also on the simple risk-return trade-offs offered by these assets. As a result, the correlation
between stock returns and labour income gains required to resolve the asset allocation puzzle
does not, after all, have to be all that high, leaving open the possibility that it can be sufficiently
low to also justify the investment horizon advice.
The principal contributions of this paper have been, first, to confirm the theoretical validity
of the above logic, and second, to assess its empirical validity using historical data from a number
of countries. The results of the latter exercise are somewhat ambiguous. Although the critical
inequalities identified by our model are almost always evident in data based on aggregate per-
capita labour income, the imprecision of our parameter estimates means that a number of these
inequalities are statistically insignificant. In particular, the correlation between stock returns
and labour income is a little too close to its lower bound, thereby making it difficult to conclude
that this bound is truly satisfied in most cases. However, individual income processes are likely to
differ significantly from the aggregate per-capita process, and a wide range of plausible processes
satisfy the critical inequalities.
By including two risky assets, our model also permits more detailed analysis of optimal
wealth allocation. We have focused on the effect of investment horizon on the demand for
bonds and on the sensitivity of the stock/bond ratio to the volatility of labour income, but
consideration of other issues may be a useful line of future research.
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Appendix
Proof of (3) and (4)
Maximizing the expected value of (1) subject to (2) yields the first-order conditions
E[(Ri −Rf )W
−γ ] = 0, i = s, b,
which can be re-written as
logE[(1 +Ri)W
−γ ] = rf + logE[W
−γ ], i = s, b, (A-1)
where rf = log(1 + Rf ). To make this problem analytically tractable, we use two loglinear
approximations developed by Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002). First, a Taylor expansion of
the logarithmic form of (2) gives
w ≈ k + ρ(w + rp) + (1− ρ)l, (A-2)
where rp = log(1 +Rp), l = logL, w = logW ,
ρ =
exp(w + E[rp − l])
1 + exp(w + E[rp − l])
< 1,
and
k = log(1 + exp(w + E[rp − l]))− ρ(w + E[rp − l]).
Second, a Taylor expansion of log(1 +Rp) yields
rp ≈ rf + αs(rs − rf ) + αb(rb − rf ) +
1
2
(
αs(1− αs)σ
2
s − 2αsαbσsb + αb(1− αb)σ
2
b
)
, (A-3)
where ri = log(1 +Ri), σ
2
i = Var[ri], and σsb = Cov[rs, rb].
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As rs and rb are jointly normal, (A-3) implies that rp also has a normal distribution. Then,
since l is also normal, (A-2) implies that w is normal as well. Thus, both terms inside the
expectations operator in (A-1) are lognormally distributed. Using the standard properties of a
lognormal random variable, we obtain
logE[(1 +Ri)W
−γ ] = E[ri − γw] +
1
2
Var[ri − γw], i = s, b,
rf + logE[W
−γ ] = rf − γE[w] +
1
2
Var[−γw].
Substituting these back into (A-1) yields
E[ri]− rf +
σ2i
2
= γ Cov[ri, w]
= γ Cov[ri, ρrp + (1− ρ)l]
= γ ρCov[ri, αsrs + αbrb] + γ(1− ρ)Cov[ri, l],
where we used (A-2) and (A-3). This is a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns
αs and αb. Solving this system produces (3) and (4).
Proof of (5)
From the first order conditions,
αiµi = γρα
2
i σ
2
i + γραsαbσsb + γ(1− ρ)αiσli.
Therefore
φp = αs
∂E[rp]
∂αs
+ αb
∂E[rp]
∂αb
= αs(µs − αsσ
2
s − αbσsb) + αb(µb − αsσsb − αbσ
2
b )
= αsµs + αbµb − (α
2
sσ
2
s + 2αsαbσsb + α
2
bσ
2
b )
= γρα2sσ
2
s + γραsαbσsb + γ(1− ρ)αsσls + γρα
2
bσ
2
b + γραsαbσsb + γ(1− ρ)αbσlb
− (α2sσ
2
s + 2αsαbσsb + α
2
bσ
2
b )
= (γρ− 1)(α2sσ
2
s + 2αsαbσsb + α
2
bσ
2
b ) + γ(1− ρ)(αsσls + αbσlb)
= (γρ− 1)Var[rp] + γ(1− ρ)Cov[rp, l]
= Var[rp](γ(ρ+ (1− ρ)β)− 1),
where β = Cov[rp, l]/Var[rp].
Proof of (6)
The following lemma will be useful in proving (6), (8), and (11):
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Lemma 1 The second order conditions of expected utility maximization imply that
1−
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αb
> 0.
Proof. Recall that the investor’s objective function is
F (αs, αb) = E
[
W 1−γ
1− γ
]
,
implying the first order conditions
∂F
∂αi
= E[W−γ(Ri −Rf )] = 0, i = s, b.
Using the lognormality of returns and labour income,
∂F
∂αi
≈ Gi ≡ E[exp(ri − γw)]− E[exp(rf − γw)]
= exp
(
E[ri − γw] +
1
2
Var[ri − γw]
)
− exp
(
E[rf − γw] +
1
2
Var[−γw]
)
= exp
(
µi + rf − γE[w]− γCov[ri, w] +
γ2
2
Var[w]
)
− exp
(
rf − γE[w] +
γ2
2
Var[w]
)
= exp
(
rf − γE[w] +
γ2
2
Var[w]
)(
exp (µi − γCov[ri, w])− 1
)
= exp(A)(exp(Bi)− 1),
where
A = rf − γE[w] +
γ2
2
Var[w]
and
Bi = µi − γCov[ri, w] = µi − γραsσis − γραbσib − γ(1− ρ)σli.
Since the first order conditions reduce to Bi = 0, we have
∂Gi
∂αj
= exp(A)
∂Bi
∂αj
and
∂Gi
∂ρ
= exp(A)
∂Bi
∂ρ
when evaluated at the optimal portfolio. Furthermore, since ρ (via E[rp]) is a function of (αs, αb),
the second order derivatives of F satisfy
∂2F
∂αj∂αi
≈
∂Gi
∂αj
+
∂Gi
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αj
= exp(A)
(
∂Bi
∂αj
+
∂Bi
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αj
)
.
The second order conditions for expected utility maximization therefore imply that(
∂Bs
∂αs
+
∂Bs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
)(
∂Bb
∂αb
+
∂Bb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αb
)
−
(
∂Bs
∂αb
+
∂Bs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αb
)(
∂Bb
∂αs
+
∂Bb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
)
> 0.
If we expand both terms and rearrange, we obtain the following equivalent condition:
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂αb
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂αs
+
∂ρ
∂αs
(
∂Bb
∂αb
∂Bs
∂ρ
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂ρ
)
+
∂ρ
∂αb
(
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂ρ
−
∂Bb
∂αs
∂Bs
∂ρ
)
> 0. (A-4)
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Now return to the first order conditions Bi = 0 for i = s, b. In the main text we solve these
two equations to obtain (3) and (4), which give αs and αb as functions of ρ (and the various
model parameters). That is, we effectively treat the first order conditions as equations of the
form
0 = Bi(αs(ρ), αb(ρ), ρ), i = s, b.
Differentiating with respect to ρ implies that
0 =
∂Bs
∂ρ
+
∂Bs
∂αs
∂αs
∂ρ
+
∂Bs
∂αb
∂αb
∂ρ
and
0 =
∂Bb
∂ρ
+
∂Bb
∂αs
∂αs
∂ρ
+
∂Bb
∂αb
∂αb
∂ρ
.
Thus
∂Bb
∂αb
∂Bs
∂ρ
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂ρ
= −
(
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂αb
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂αs
)
∂αs
∂ρ
and
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂ρ
−
∂Bb
∂αs
∂Bs
∂ρ
= −
(
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂αb
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂αs
)
∂αb
∂ρ
.
Condition (A-4) then implies that(
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂αb
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂αs
)(
1−
∂ρ
∂αs
∂αs
∂ρ
−
∂ρ
∂αb
∂αb
∂ρ
)
> 0.
Finally, note that
∂Bi
∂αj
= −γρσij ,
which implies that
∂Bs
∂αs
∂Bb
∂αb
−
∂Bs
∂αb
∂Bb
∂αs
= γ2ρ2(σ2sσ
2
b − σ
2
sb) > 0.
Therefore, we have
1−
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αb
> 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. ¥
Differentiating the equations αi = αi(γ, ρ(αs, αb)), i = s, b, with respect to γ shows that
dαi
dγ
=
∂αi
∂γ
+
∂αi
∂ρ
(
∂ρ
∂αs
dαs
dγ
+
∂ρ
∂αb
dαb
dγ
)
, i = s, b.
Solving this linear system of two equations for dαs
dγ
and dαb
dγ
, we get
dαs
dγ
=
∂αs
∂γ
+ ∂ρ
∂α
b
(
∂αs
∂ρ
∂αb
∂γ
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂αs
∂γ
)
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
and
dαb
dγ
=
∂αb
∂γ
+ ∂ρ
∂αs
(
∂αb
∂ρ
∂αs
∂γ
−
∂αs
∂ρ
∂αb
∂γ
)
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
.
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Defining α = αs/αb, it follows that
dα
dγ
=
1
(αb)2
(
αb
dαs
dγ
− αs
dαb
dγ
)
=
1
(αb)2

αb ∂αs∂γ − αs ∂αb∂γ +
(
∂αs
∂ρ
∂αb
∂γ
−
∂αs
∂γ
∂αb
∂ρ
)(
αb
∂ρ
∂α
b
+ αs
∂ρ
∂αs
)
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b

 .
From Lemma 1, the denominator is positive, so that dα
dγ
has the same sign as the numerator.
Now,
αb
∂αs
∂γ
− αs
∂αb
∂γ
=
1− ρ
γ2ρ2∆
(µsσlb − µbσls),
and
∂αs
∂ρ
∂αb
∂γ
−
∂αs
∂γ
∂αb
∂ρ
=
µsσlb − µbσls
γ2ρ3∆
where we have used (3) and (4) to calculate the partial derivatives. Further, because ∂ρ
∂E[rp]
=
ρ(1− ρ),
∂ρ
∂αi
= ρ(1− ρ)
∂E[rp]
∂αi
.
Therefore, the numerator of the expression for dα
dγ
equals
(1− ρ)(1 + φp)
γ2ρ2∆
(µsσlb − µbσls).
Since ρ < 1 and ∆ > 0, dα
dγ
has the same sign as (1 + φp)(µsσlb − µbσls).
Proof of (8)
Differentiating the equations αi = αi(ρ(αs, αb, z)), i = s, b, with respect to z shows that
dαi
dz
=
∂αi
∂ρ
(
∂ρ
∂z
+
∂ρ
∂αs
dαs
dz
+
∂ρ
∂αb
dαb
dz
)
, i = s, b.
Solving this linear system of two equations for dαs
dz
and dαb
dz
, we get
dαs
dz
=
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂z
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
and
dαb
dz
=
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂z
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
.
From Lemma 1, the denominator of these two expressions is positive, so that dαs
dz
has the same
sign as
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂z
=
1− ρ
γρ∆
(
σ2b (µs − γσls)− σsb(µb − γσlb)
)
,
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where we have used (3) to calculate the first partial derivative. Since 0 < ρ < 1 and ∆ > 0, dαs
dz
has the same sign as
σ2b (µs − γσls)− σsb(µb − γσlb).
Similarly, dαb
dz
has the same sign as
σ2s(µb − γσlb)− σsb(µs − γσls).
Proof of (11)
Differentiating the equations αi = αi(σl, ρ(αs, αb, σl)), i = s, b, with respect to σl shows that
dαi
dσl
=
∂αi
∂σl
+
∂αi
∂ρ
(
∂ρ
∂σl
+
∂ρ
∂αs
dαs
dσl
+
∂ρ
∂αb
dαb
dσl
)
, i = s, b.
Solving this linear system of two equations for dαs
dσ
l
and dαb
dσ
l
, we get
dαs
dσl
=
∂αs
∂σ
l
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂αs
∂σ
l
∂ρ
∂α
b
+ ∂αb
∂σ
l
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
+ ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂σ
l
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
and
dαb
dσl
=
∂αb
∂σ
l
+ ∂αb
∂ρ
∂αs
∂σ
l
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂σ
l
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
+ ∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂σ
l
1− ∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
.
It follows that
dα
dσl
=
(
αb
∂αs
∂σ
l
−
∂αb
∂σ
l
αs
)
+
(
αb
∂αs
∂ρ
−
∂αb
∂ρ
αs
)
∂ρ
∂σ
l
+
(
∂αs
∂ρ
∂αb
∂σ
l
−
∂αs
∂σ
l
∂αb
∂ρ
)(
αb
∂ρ
∂α
b
+ αs
∂ρ
∂αs
)
α2b(1−
∂αs
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂αs
−
∂αb
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂α
b
)
.
Because E[l] = logE[L]− σ2l /2,
∂ρ
∂σl
= σl(1− ρ)ρ.
Further, because ∂ρ
∂E[rp]
= ρ(1− ρ),
∂ρ
∂αi
= ρ(1− ρ)
∂E[rp]
∂αi
.
After some algebraic manipulation, we find that the numerator of dα
dσ
l
equals
(1− ρ)θ
σlγρ2∆
(σlbµs − σls µb) ,
where
θ = 1 + (1− ρ)φp − ρσ
2
l .
Since 0 < ρ < 1 and ∆ > 0, dα
dσ
l
has the same sign as θ(σlbµs − σls µb).
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